Abstract: Generating data is analytically crucial for the identification of empirical trends and for theoretically explaining the is analytically crucial for the identification of empirical trends and for theoretically explaining the occurrence, escalation and duration of war. Practically , it contributes to the objective of developing preventive measures. In order preventive measures. In order In order to evaluate the evolution and transformation of war, in this article, we first examine the macrotrends for the period between 1946 and 2007 compiled in a new Consolidated List of Wars. In the second part, we compare data from major datagathering projects to
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politics. It thus remains of central importance for the study of politics and social processes in general and conflict escalation in particular. While intrastate violence is the dominant form of war in the contemporary international system, it would be premature to regard interstate wars as on the brink of extinc tion. The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan or the recent war in the Caucasus between Russia and Georgia in Au gust 2008, as well as the interventionism of some democracies in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq raise some doubt about this hypothesis.
Secondly, in contradiction to the underlying logic of intersub jectivity the "world of war is what researchers make of it" (Eber wein /Chojnacki 2001: 29) . The major data gathering projects such as the Correlates of War project (COW), the Uppsala Con flict Data Program (UCDP) or the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg portray different worlds of wars depending on different definitions, operational criteria and classifications. One price to be paid for that pluralism is the problem of credibility in regard to con
Introduction
The scientific study of war has come a long way. Incremental progress has been achieved with several islands of empirical fin dings and theoretical explanations. Today, we can build both on empirical support for specific propositions (e.g. democratic peace) and on productive theoretical debates (see, for example, the controversy over greed and grievance in civil wars or the growing incorporation of gender and civilian agency). Besides this good news of both additive and -at least to some degree -integrative accumulation of knowledge, a number of practical and analytical issues remain controversial or unresolved.
First and foremost, war as a social institution and a mechanism for the allocation of certain values is still a present feature of * Dr. Sven Chojnacki is Professor of Peace and Security Studies at Freie Universi tät Berlin and Project Coordinator at the research center SFB 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, which is funded by the German Research Foun dation. ** Gregor Reisch is Student Research Assistant at the research center SFB 700
Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood.
flict research. From a practitioner's perspective, this evokes the consequential problem of choice since we do not know which of the presented 'worlds of war' is the most appropriate for the study of war and the implementation of preventive measures.
Thirdly, intrastate as well as interstate wars are not only fun damental motors of social change (Coser 1956 ) and even in ternational order (Daase 1999; Holsti 1991 Finally, the concept of war is an aggregate of various interac tions and violent events with a predefined threshold of victims between political entities. But war comprises different social processes (Wood 2008) and multiple paths lead to the outbreak and escalation of war (see Bremer 1996 for international wars; Kalyvas 2006 for the logics of internal violence). This implies that wars do not necessarily start as wars from the outset. More over, the existing yearly based countrylevel datasets presented by the leading data gathering projects make it difficult to ana lyze the spatial and temporal dynamics of violence (Buhaug 2007; Restrepo et al. 2006 While the SFB 700 in general focuses on "new" or hybrid modes of governance in areas of limited statehood 2 , EDACS collects and analyzes event data in order to explain the evolution and demise of armed conflict and security in zones of turmoil in failed states.
The Consolidated List of Wars (CoLoW)
Among conflict researchers there is a growing consensus that the "classical" statecentric conception of war can no longer "classical" statecentric conception of war can no longer grasp a large number of armed conflicts (e.g. Bakonyi et al. 2006; Harbom 2007; Kaldor 1999) . Departing from this obser vation, Chojnacki (2006) has developed a broadened typology of war which proceeds from the political status of the protag onists and from territorial expansion. Four core types of war result from this:
1. interstate wars (between at least two sovereign states), 2. extrastate wars (between a state and one or more nonstate groups outside its territorial boundaries), 3. intrastate wars (between a government and one or more nonstate parties within the boundaries of an international ly recognized state), and 4. substate wars (between mostly nonstate actors within or across borders).
The proposed integration of a substate war category reflects the debate about the changing patterns of warfare in the post Second World War period and follows the underlying rule that a classification of war is best arranged according to the political status of the protagonists (see, similarly Sarkees/Singer 2001). In consequence, wars between private armed groups can be made accessible for both empirical and systematic analyses (concer ning their occurrence, duration, and correlates) and for com parative purposes (in relation, for example, to intrastate and interstate wars). 3 The degree of differentiation is sufficient in order to obtain mutually exclusive categories which allow the comparative study of wars (Chojnacki 2006 ).
In conceptual terms, war is defined as an extreme type of mili tary violence between at least two politically organized groups (Bull 1977: 184; Vasquez 1993 Vasquez : 2129 . In order to operational ly define the intensity of violence, the idea of a quantitative threshold is retained (Collier/Hoeffler 2001; Small/Singer 1982) . The following criteria are applied to determine wars: With regard to interstate wars, the Correlates of War Project's (COW) threshold of 1,000 "battle deaths" for the whole con flict among military personnel only is kept. However, a differentiation is introduced in order to grasp the specific character of extrastate, intrastate, and substate wars: these conflicts resulted in at least 1,000 military or civilian deaths over their entire duration and at least 100 deaths per conflictyear. The reason is quite simple: in contrast to inter state wars, these wars are usually not characterized by huge decisive battles between regular armed forces but much more frequently by small skirmishes and focused attacks against ci vilian targets.
4 In order to grasp the possible transition from one war type to another (such as the internal developments in Iraq reveal) we scrutinize and record changes in the types of war on an annual basis.
Patterns of War, 1946-2007
Based on the definitional and operational criteria described above, a total of 178 wars were coded for the period since World War II. 5 By far the largest number of these, two thirds -or 118 to be precise -are intrastate wars. States fought 24 wars against each other, making interstate war the second highestranking type right before extra and substate wars with 19 and 17, re 4 In order to rule out massacres, and sporadic violence the conflict accounted for at least 25 deaths on each side per year and 100 death per year altogether. The beginning year is the first year in which at least 100 people were killed. A war is rated as having ended only if the intensity of conflict has remained below the threshold of 100 deaths for at least two years, if actors give up vio lence or if an effective peace agreement is concluded. If fighting within a state occurs in distinct regions and between different rebel groups, multiple wars are coded. For further details see Chojnacki (2006) . 5 Coding manual and replication data are available at http://www.sfbgover nance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_c/c4/data.html spectively. Figure 1 shows how the yearly number of wars has changed over time.
The empirical results clearly indicate a dominance of intrastate wars at the global level for nearly the entire period. Since the 1960s, wars inside states are in the majority, reaching a peak proportion between 1980 and the mid1990s. Since the end of the Cold War, the annual frequency of intrastate wars has decreased slightly, but they remain the dominant war pheno menon on a global scale.
Nevertheless, the relative importance of substate wars has grown over the last two decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the proportion of substate wars has increased from not even five percent (197180) to roughly a quarter, measured by the total number of wars per annum. Current substate wars in So malia or the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are mainly fought between armed nonstate actors. In these instances, actor constellations can no longer be reduced to the state vs. more or less organized rebel groups, which di rect their political and military strategy in accordance with the principle of statehood. Rather, multiple zones of military and political control emerge, giving rise to partially overlapping loyalties and identities and the emergence of alternative, terri torially restricted forms of coercive violence. This war type has somewhat superseded extrastate war, which gradually decrea sed in importance after the era of decolonization in the 1970s. However, the war between Israel and Palestine and armed re sistance within at least temporarily dependent territories (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq) support the assumption that extrastate wars will not vanish completely.
Similarly, interstate wars remain a part of the reality of interna tional politics, but on a rather low level as well. Yet, the recent fullscale war in the Caucasus between Russia and Georgia over the political status of South Ossetia reminds us that drawing conclusions on interstate violence and a potential declining relevance for regional and international security would be pre mature.
Concerning the durability of different war types, the order of relative relevance slightly changes. Of the wars which have ended (N=150) in the period under consideration, extrastate wars were the most persistent with a mean duration of 7.6 years. Intra and substate wars lasted for 6 and 6.1 years while inter state wars were fought on average for just 2.1 years. The most warprone decades in terms of war onsets were the 1970s and the 1990s with 36 new wars each. If the trend for the running decade continues it will be the one with the least outbreaks of wars since the 1950s with its 22 onsets.
From a regional perspective, Africa was the most warridden continent until the end of the last century, experiencing 62 of 178 war onsets between 1946 and 2007. The numbers for Asia, the Middle East, the Americas and Europe are 56, 30, 17 and 13, respectively. Only the current decade is experiencing a slight shift towards Asia. 6 of the 16 onsets since the year 2001 were in Asia and Asia is adversely affected by 12 of the 28 ongoing wars in 2007 followed by Africa with 4 and 11 wars in that order.
The World of Wars in 2007
Africa is not only special in regard to the total number of wars, but also in the amount of privatized largescale violence it has experienced: 9 out of 17 substate wars have been fought in Af rica. And with intercommunal violence in Nigeria and factio nal fighting in the DRC and in Somalia, the largest number of ongoing substate wars takes place there as well.
6
Africa's oldest internalwar is the one in southern Sudan, which devastated the country for 25 years and continued in the sha dow of the mass violence in Darfur. More subSaharan inter nalwars took place in Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria's delta region and Uganda. The violence in Burundi nearly ceased completely and it has to be determined on the basis of numbers for 2008 if the war actually ended in 2007, because it might have not reached the required threshold for two consecutive years. In the Maghreb, violence resurged in Algeria after it had dees calated in 2006.
As mentioned above, Asia is not only the continent with the most ongoing wars; it is hosting the longest running war as well. The war in Myanmar 7 between diverse ethnic groups and the government started in 1948 and has been fought for 60 years now. In 2007 it was overshadowed by protests flaring up in August, leading to the largest antigovernment demonstra tions in twenty years, which were brutally suppressed by the military junta later that year. Other ongoing wars in Southeast Asia include the two very durable wars in the Philippines which both started at the beginning of the 1970s and the rather young After wars ended in El Salvador (1991), Guatemala (1995) and Peru (1999) , the 43 year old war in Colombia is the only on going war in the Americas making it the continent with the least wars in 2007 right after Australia/Oceania with no on going wars. These two continents are exceptional in even more ways, being the only ones, which experienced no war onsets since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, they are the only regions since 1946 without the occurrence of substate wars. Be that as it may, with the drug economy providing money for a large number of armed groups it seems unlikely that the Ameri cas will become completely warfree in the near future.
This overview shows how the world of wars looks through the lens of the CoLoW. In the following section of this article we will compare the above outlined developments with empirical findings of other data projects, aiming for a more comprehen sive understanding of war and its scientific coverage.
Different Worlds of War? A Comparison of Warlists
In order to explain the occurrence and duration of different classes of war and to contribute to the objective of prevention, empirical research needs plausible operational definitions and reliable data -and, of course, theoretical foundations. As we know that concepts and definitions of war are closely linked (Kreutz 2008) . For the purpose of this analysis we rely on the "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset". 11 It defines "conflict" as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state" (Harbom et al. 2008b : 1) and "war" as a high intensity of armed conflict resulting in at least 1.000 battlerelated deaths in a single year.
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Thus similar to CoLoW, UCDP/PRIO uses quantitative criteria. In classificatory terms, the program also integrates four types of armed conflict: extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and internationalized internal of which the latter is characterized by interven tion from secondary parties on one or both sides. Obviously, this typology overlaps closely with the Consolidated List of Wars, but differs with respect to the fourth category. While CoLoW integrates the substate type of war, UCDP/PRIO in troduces internationalized internal armed conflicts. Notwith standing the goal of a sound classification, it is unclear why the 'intervention criterion' is proposed only for internal conflicts and why other types are not being considered. Evidently, mili tary intervention can take place in a variety of settings. This is clearly the case considering the Korean War (an interstate 9 The point of departure for these considerations was a comparison of data on violent conflicts, conducted by Eberwein and Chojnacki (2001) . The key fin ding was that the datagathering projects analyzed showed different 'worlds' of violence irrespective of whether they were based on either qualitative or quantitative operational criteria. 10 Therefore, we have excluded the following projects: (a) the war data from the Correlates of War project (which has been the most influential research pro gram on the scientific study of war for more than three decades), because of the limited timespan of currently available data ( . 12 UCDP/PRIO also collects data on "minor armed conflicts" with at least 25 but fewer than 1.000 battlerelated deaths in a given year.
war) or the substate war in Liberia in the 1990s. 13 Irrespective of this particular weakness and given the perceived conceptual limitation of a statecentric perspective, UCDP recently devel oped a new dataset in which data on nonstate armed conflicts is collected promoting a more comprehensive analysis of the incidence of war (Kreutz 2008) . But due to the limited time span (200206), we have excluded this promising new dataset from our analysis.
In contrast to the Consolidated List of Wars and UCDP/PRIO, both the AKUF group and the HIIK make use of qualitative de finitions of armed conflict and war. AKUF defines war as a "vio lent mass conflict" between armed forces of two parties or more (of which at least on one side regular armed forces of a particular government are involved) with a minimum of control and or ganization on both conflicting sides and a "certain durability" indicating a systematic strategy of fighting (Schreiber 2008: 10) . Similar to AKUF, the Heidelberg group uses qualitative criteria such as "certain continuity", "extensive measures" where the destruction is "massive and of long duration" (HIIK 2007). 14 Obviously, the definitions of these qualitative projects can lead to different interpretations of specific events, complicate the replication of the data and, therefore, undermine the criterion of intersubjectivity. 15 A major advantage of the AKUF dataset, however, is the descriptive information provided for single wars that are classified as antiregime, autonomy and secession, in terstate, decolonization or other intra-state war.
16 HIIK in con trast, offers only a simple dichotomous typology differentiating between internal wars and international wars.
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By including all types of war, the results for the yearly number of ongoing wars reveal partly different worlds of war on a glob al level.
18 Given the different operational criteria, we should expect some level of agreement between similar projects, i.e. greater discrepancies between quantitativebased and qualita tiveoriented research programs. Surprisingly, given its broad and fairly vague definition of war, HIIK offers the lowest values for all waryears. All other projects report numbers of wars three 13 Therefore, and in contrast to UCDP/PRIO, unilateral or multilateral inter vention should not be treated as a type of war in its own right, but rather as a particular form of external conflict behaviour that can then be related to the respective types of war. By incorporating military intervention into the scientific study of war in this manner, it would allow for an assessment of qualitative transformations of violence over time, thus rendering a theoreti cally and practically important point of departure for clarifying the relation between external intervention and war dynamics (Chojnacki 2006 ). 14 In the following comparison we included the "high" intensity levels of "severe crisis" and "war", but excluded the "low" and "medium" levels of conflict, be cause of the nonviolent or sporadic character of these types of disputes. HIIK defines "war" as "violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration." A "severe crisis" is defined by violent force that is used repeatedly in an organized way (HIIK 2007). 15 In social sciences the criterion of intersubjectivity is the regulatory mecha nism used to compensate for the definitional voluntarism. Any person must be able to reproduce the same dataset using the same criteria and, by logical implication, to reproduce thereby the results obtained by others (Eberwein/ Chojnacki 2001: 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 to four times higher than that of HIIK. Because of the extent of the difference, we have decided to include the HIIK "high intensity level" of "severe crisis" represented by the dashed line. By offering a similar pattern at a quite higher level, the HIIK data now converge at least for the period 199096 with the warlist presented by AKUF, but diverge considerably thereafter. Equally interesting is the observation that AKUF and CoLoW show a very similar pattern until 1999 and subsequently in creasingly converge. In contrast, UCDP/PRIO 19 oscillates be tween CoLoW and AKUF until 2000, but takes a very different turn after 2001. Besides considerable differences all datasets report at least a minor or, in the case of AKUF, more of a major decline in the occurrence of wars since the beginning of the 1990s -coming, however, from different levels.
We find a slightly different overall picture of violence compa ring the dominant class of ongoing intra-state wars reported by the four datasets. Here AKUF and UCDP/PRIO are closer and show a similar pattern of decline, but at different levels and with different trends since 2003. In contrast, the Consolidated List of Wars (CoLoW) indicates a more constant level of orga nized violence within states. Again, HIIK is a clear outlier in this group with the lowest amount of intrastate waryears and distinct annual variations in wars and severe crises (the dashed line) for the last decade.
Yet, another comparison (see Table 1 ) including the types of war also uncovers that looking at the bare numbers CoLoW and UCDP/PRIO show the greatest agreement, but differ along identified war types. The level of disagreement concerning subtypes of war within states, which are only presented by the AKUF Group and the Consolidated List of War, is also re markable. Most notably, both projects report equal values for antiregime wars, but different worlds of secessionist wars. Furthermore, AKUF's type of miscellaneous wars is more a re sidual category for unclear cases. Striking, however, is that the 19 For reasons of comparison we excluded "minor armed conflicts" from the UCDP/PRIO data, which for their whole duration have not resulted in more than 1.000 battle related deaths. This applies for all UCDP/PRIO data presen ted in the third section of this article.
considered cases (e.g. Somalia) overlap to some degree with the substate wars listed in the CoLoW project. CoLoW and AKUF also offer insights into the occurrence of military interventions independent of the type of war. 20
The reasons for the observable variations are manifold. A closer look at the data reveals that some of the differences are related to different starting and end dates depending on the proposed coding rules
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, as well as to the issue of splitting specific wars into several separate armed conflicts (e.g. Columbia which is considered as two wars by the AKUF group). Moreover, we find several waryears neither listed in UCDP nor in CoLoW. A possible explanation is that AKUF includes many periods of inactivity boosting the total amount of waryears. In the case of HIIK, several modifications of coding rules within the last years may have a negative impact on the precision of the coll ected data. The main reason for the divergence, however, is that qualitative projects build on vague or wider definitions of war. Like HIIK, they are listing major armed conflicts as lower levels of intensity (e.g. "severe crises"), which are considered as wars by other projects.
The attempt by the Heidelberg group to integrate different stages of conflict (latent conflict, manifest conflict, crisis, severe crisis, war) is a necessary step in the direction of uncovering the escalation and deescalation processes of armed conflict. The lack in reproducible standards, however, limits its use for determining both stages of armed conflict and a precise timing of escalatory shifts in the different intensity levels identified. Moreover, the term "severe crisis" is somewhat misleading. It trivializes several cases that have been compiled as wars by all other projects and therefore implies a more optimistic perspec tive on the world of wars. As a qualitative project, AKUF offers 20 As results of an earlier study have shown, all war types could be subject to in terventionism, but with the highest risk for substate wars (Chojnacki 2006) . Taking this into account, the interventions in Liberia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Af ghanistan or in the DRC indicate an internationalization of conflict dynamics as well as the emergence of complex conflict systems. 21 Most striking in this respect are the low numbers for war onsets in the UCDP/ PRIO data. These are due to a very recent change in coding rules for the ver sion 42008 of the Armed Conflict Dataset, which is differentiating between startdates of conflicts and conflict episodes (Harbom et al.2008b: 7f.) . 1 Unfortunately there was no data available for war onsets from HIIK. 2 HIIK is differentiating between various dimensions of conflict such as territory, secession, decolonization, autonomy, system/ideology, national power, regional predominance, international power, resources, and others. For reasons of comparison, these dimensions or items cannot be regarded as distinct classes, because they are not mutually exclusive. 3 AKUF and CoLoW have no distinct category of internationalized war, but indicate whether single wars are subject to military intervention by third parties. a more sound understanding and picture of warfare, irrespec tive of certain limits in methodology, whereas HIIK seems to be more appropriate for the documentation of a global conflict panorama. All things considered, the qualitative projects are, to some degree, useful as supplementary surveys of violence pro viding important qualitative clues.
22 But even stringent quanti tative operational definitions do not necessarily guarantee con sistency across similar time series. As the comparison of CoLoW and UCDP/PRIO reveals, different coding procedures and the use of different news sources obviously account for certain vari ations. In sum, the results underline that it makes a difference which dataset is used to describe or to explain the occurrence and duration of organized violence in the international system. For practitioners it is thus important to note that each world of war reflects the particular methodological view and theoretical assumption of the respective datagenerating group.
Disaggregating War
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Focusing on war as a defined aggregate of violent conflict is a necessity for the scientific study of the duration, transformati on, and consequences of extreme periods of violence between or within states, but it does not tell us much about the spatial and temporal dynamics of warfare. When a particular dataset identifies a country as affected by war, this does not imply that violence occurs continuously and all across its territory. Both for theoretical and practical reasons a process perspective is needed. Thus, if we assume that war results from the interac tion process between at least two parties and consists of a series 22 Both AKUF (with a yearbook and reports on ongoing wars as well as an war archive at their website) and HIIK (with the yearly published "Conflict Baro meter") offer interesting insights on armed actors, issues at stake, and conflict processes over time. 23 We thank Max Grömping and Michael Spiess from the EDACS team for their superb research assistance. Coding manual and replication data for this article are available at http://www.sfbgovernance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_c/ c4/data.html of discrete actions, we need data on single violent events with exact information on intensity, participants, and geographical location.
One approach allowing a more precise analysis of timede pendent variation of violence and its geographical dispersion is presented by the Event Data Project on Conflict and Security (EDACS) which collects, integrates and analyzes data on violent events (Chojnacki/Metternich 2008) . The basic unit of observa tion in the EDACS dataset is the single event, which is defined as a violent incidence with at least one casualty resulting from the direct use of armed force. 24 For every event the number of fatalities is given and whenever possible the dataset provides a differentiation between civilian and military casualties. This approach solves the problem of defining thresholds (Collier/ Hoeffler 2001; Sambanis 2004 ) as we operate with continuous numbers of casualties. Following the logic of disaggregation, the dataset contains detailed information on dates, actors, in tensity, and the latitude and longitude of various regions, cities and roads which are identified locations of violent events (for a similar approach see Raleigh/Hegre 2005) . 25 In order to ac count for different patterns of violent incidences, EDACS also collects data on two types of violence: fighting and one-sided attacks. Fighting is defined as armed interaction between two or more organized groups. In consequence, we define onesided attacks as direct unilateral violence by organized groups aimed at civilian or military targets. 26 Since onesided attacks can also be directed at military targets, the definition proposed by EDACS is obviously dissimilar to UCDP's concept of "onesided 24 For operational procedures and the entire list of variable see the coding manu al at http://www.sfbgovernance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_c/c4/index. html 25 For the purposes of data collection, the information is drawn from the infor mation management system LexisNexis including all the articles published in major newspapers (New York Times, The Guardian, Washington Post) and comprehensive news services (BBC Monitoring). 26 Roadside bombings, suicide bombers, or massacres would therefore be one sided attacks independently from who is targeted. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 27 The AKUF group classifies Somalia as a "miscellaneous in trastate war" with direct foreign involve ment starting 1988. For UCDP/PRIO it is an internal armed conflict (episode start years: 1978, 1982, 1986, 2001, 2006) with varying conflict parties and several years missing for the period 19902007 (not included: 19972000, 20032005) , and an internationalized armed conflict in 2006 and 2007. This is also reflected in Figure 4 , which compares the annual deaths reported, by UCDP and EDACS.
28 Surprisingly, UCDP reports an extreme peak for 1991 (at least 10.000 battle related deaths), but a relatively small amount of yearly deaths in the following years as compared to EDACS. Also striking is the observation that the number of annual deaths reported by EDACS (fighting only) remains on a relatively high level (be tween at least 200 and 1.250 deaths per year and with an yearly 27 For the intensity level of war HIIK just takes account of the years 20062007 and the TFG as a conflict party. For lesser intensity levels HIIK lists five more conflicts. But of these just two are conflicts with only nonstate actors as conflict parties (Puntland vs. Somaliland, 19982007; Maakhir vs. Puntland, 2007) . 28 The annual deaths compiled by EDACS will in the future also be used for the Consolidated List of War.
average of over 600 deaths) even in the years that are missing in the UCDP dataset. A possible explanation for these discrepan cies is the use of different news sources (and in case of UCDP a change of sources over time). However, the escalation process 200607 including foreign military interventions by Ethiopia shows a similar pattern in both datasets.
By disaggregating warfare in Somalia, EDACS contains a sum total of 1.829 violent events for Somalia with a minimum of 22.322 fatalities 29 in a vector (point) format. Figure 5 maps all reported violent events for the period 19902007. Obviously, violence is not distributed across the entire territory, but very often takes place close to strategically valuable locations such as 29 The actual proportion of total events and deaths due to direct violence is pro bably higher than that reported in the selected articles by LexisNexis. We estimate, however, that the results are reliable and add to the overall picture. Conceptually, EDACS collects both "minimum" and "maximum" values for fatalities. For the purpose of this analysis we have decided to use the "mini mum" of fatalities. In the future we will offer a best estimate measure. EDACS not only points to a great variance in the values of events and deaths over time and in space, but also to a continu ing trend of fragmentation, i.e. factional splitting of nonstate actors. As Figure 6 shows, warfare in Somalia is characterized by a large number of mostly nonstate actors, which were active in all years of the period under observation. It is noticeable that armed actors appear to be on the increase after 1992 when ter ritorial control vanished and more and more nonstate parties fought over scarce resources and political power. Even political autonomy and the establishment of relatively stable structures of governance in Northern Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland) are no guarantee for a decrease in numbers of violent actors and events (for ongoing violence at the borders of Somaliland and Puntland see Figure 7 ). The dramatic upturn in SouthCentral Somalia and in Mogadishu as well as the increase in local vio lent events 1999 reflect a more fragmented security environ ment (Menkhaus 2007a ) with warlords losing control and local militias gaining importance. The following decline 200205 can be explained due to the regression of interclan fighting.
Finally, Figure 7 disaggregates the Somali war one step further igure 7 disaggregates the Somali war one step further and presents the violent events on an annual basis. Two em pirical findings are noteworthy: the annual statistics support timedependent and regional variations in warfare and violent events diffuse over time which is going hand in hand with the factional splitting of armed groups at the end of the 1990s.
Figure 7 also provides evidence that temporal effects and spatial dynamics of fighting might be highly dependent on third par ty intervention. As we know from qualitative studies and our data, the U.S. intervention and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the 1990s intensified informational asymmetries and threatened the interest of a number of mili tary leaders. As a consequence, fighting as well as onesided vi olence increased in the period 19931995. In contrast, the time between 1995 and 2000 was characterized by a lack of external support and is best understood as a period of "armed peace" which was used by local armed groups to consolidate power. In some circumstances these actors even introduced elements of security governance ( 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 Mogadishu South-Central Somalia Northern Somalia Chojnacki/Reisch, Collecting Data on Violent Conflicts | P E R S P E C T I V E S O N W A R become more diffused compared to the UNoperation, because local warlords have decided to build alliances with the Ethiopi an forces (see also Menkhaus 2007b) . Thus until today, for both local nonstate parties and regional actors the logic of violence seems to be more promising than the road to peace.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article we argued that the scientific study of war has come a long way, but still has a way to go. A closer look at the world of war reveals, first, that violence at the highest level of armed conflict is still a way of enforcing deci sions and allocating values. Secondly, the proposed integration of a substate war category underlines that the chameleon of war is once again changing its appearance and draws our attention to similarities and dissimilarities across different classes of war. The Consolidated List of Wars, thereby, suggests an improved perspective for the analysis of their correlates and etiologies. From a perspective of policy implications, the modifications in the typology of war are also crucial for contributing to the objective of conflict prevention. Given the complex amalgam of political, economic, identity and security dynamics in areas of limited or even absent statehood, substate wars require the invention and selection of appropriate preventive strategies to resolve them. Thirdly, the world of violence is what researchers and their operational definitions of war make of it. The identi fied discrepancies remind practitioners to carefully reflect on theoretical assumptions and operational procedures. Finally, the analysis with disaggregated data presented by EDACS un derlines the benefits provided by opening the black box of war. The disaggregated data offer the opportunity to deal with cat egorizational difficulties by differentiating between conflict dyads and myriads on a lower level of aggregation and thus as sist in coping with the evolution of specific types of behavior over time.
In order to contribute to conflict prevention the scientific study of war requires the ability to trace the steps to war by distin guishing phases of violent conflict. Methodologically, this necessitates relying much more on research strategies in the face of changes in the structural dimensions and process dy namics of organized violence. We need both concepts and mi croanalytical strategies that help us to study the conditions of escalation and to understand the inherent behavioral logic of violence in different war settings. AKUF, HIIK, and UCDP/PRIO provide some information in this regard. But either the criteria for escalation are not sufficiently reproducible (as in the case of HIIK) or the concepts are limited to only two stages of armed conflict (as in the case of AKUF and UCDP/PRIO). The quantita tive oriented strategy of disaggregating armed conflict and war into single violent events provides additional and welldefined criteria for the analysis of escalation processes: an increase in the number of conflict parties, a spread of violent events (to new regions/across borders), or a pursuit of new conflict strate gies (e.g. violence against civilians). The great variance in the number of violent actors in Somalia, for example, in the value of events and deaths over time as well as in space would be lost using data on a higher level of aggregation. And because of the event character of the data, given their sufficient validity, it of fers the possibility to construct thresholds of armed conflict beneath the level of war -and to study not just mere correlates of war.
In a first comparison of data on violent conflicts Eberwein and Chojnacki (2001) concluded that "we can still do -and must do -better". Today we would add: quantitative research has lear ned several lessons from its critics and is getting better in con tributing to the analysis of microfoundations and dynamics of armed conflict. In this regard, EDACS is a good example that quantitative and qualitative approaches stand in a complemen tary relation and should not per se be regarded as competing or mutually exclusive scientific orientations.
